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Abstract
In this paper, we analyze the optimal energy transition of a two-sector economy
(energy and final goods) with exhaustible oil reserves, a renewable source of en-
ergy and a pollution threat. The latter corresponds to a pollution threshold above
which a part of the capital is lost (following flooding for instance). We show that
the optimal energy transition path may correspond to a corner regime in which
the economy starts using both resources, then crosses the pollution threshold and
therefore loses a part of its capital. At the end, the sole adoption of the renewable
energy is optimal only in the long run. This result is in line with the asymptotic
energy transition arguments stating that the transition to "clean" energy may hap-
pen only in the long run. We also show that economy reduces the use of energy
resource as long as the productivity of capital and energy services is high. There-
fore, public policies should promote investments in energy innovation that targets
productive sector, home appliances and buildings and helps to save both money
and energy. We extend the present model to allow for additional investment in
energy saving technologies. Our main results show that this additional investment
favours the energy transition in the sense that it increases the time within which the
economy may experience the catastrophe and the welfare of the society. For policy
implications, economic instruments such as taxes on "dirty" energy, subsidies on
"clean" energy or incentives for energy saving technologies need to be implemented
in order to promote the energy transition. This is particularly important for de-
veloping countries that mostly rely on polluting energy resources and are the most
vulnerable to climate change. But those economic instruments should be carefully
designed in line with the asymptotic energy transition result.
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1 Introduction
In order to reduce global CO2 emissions up to 50 per cent from 2005 to 2050, several
energy policies use scenarios that mostly include the adoption of renewable energy (RE)
sources and investments in energy saving technologies (EST). Despite the growing invest-
ments in the production of RE (63 to 244 billion USD from 2006 to 2012 (GEA,2012)),
fossil fuels as "dirty" energy are still mainly used (78.2%) throughout the world. There-
fore it becomes crucial not only to drastically change the way energy is produced, but to
also look for energy saving strategies. According to the efficiency pathways of the Global
Energy Assessment (GEA), about one-third of overall investment in the energy sector
is efficiency related (GEA, 2012). This paper focuses on the issue of energy transition
that involves both the decision of RE adoption and that of the investment in EST. We
analyze the optimal energy transition of a two-sector economy (energy and final goods)
with exhaustible oil reserves, a renewable source of energy and a pollution threat.
The issue of energy transition involves both the decision of RE adoption and that
of the investment in EST. The former decision concerns an adoption of "clean" energy
sources as an alternative that could replace the consumption of polluting sources of en-
ergy, while the latter could help reduce overall energy consumption. At the beginning
of the literature on natural resource economics, many authors provided a different focus
on the long run depletion of oil reserves and on the polluting feature of oil. Dasgupta
and Heal (1974, 1979), Dasgupta and Stiglitz (1981) and Krautkraemer (1986) analyze
the long run depletion of oil reserves, while Nordhaus (1994) and Tahvonen (1996, 1997)
focus on the polluting aspects of oil. In this regard, one solution could be to adopt
a backstop technology (a renewable resource for instance) as a clean energy. More re-
cently, several works (Acemoglu et al., 2014; Amigues et al., 2013 and Tsur and Zemel,
2003) focus on climate change issues as one of the important reasons that encourage
the transition to clean energy or to clean technologies. As the use of polluting energy
resource generates pollution that accumulates over time, the ecological catastrophe may
occur at some point in time. The catastrophic event will generate some damage that
can be irreversible1 (Forster, 1975; Tavhonen and Withagen, 1996; Ulph and Ulph, 1997;
Pindyck, 2002; Pommeret and Prieur, 2009 and Ayong Le Kama et al., 2011). It can
also be partly reversible (Tsur and Zemel, 1996 and Naevdal, 2006), or fully reversible
(Kollenbach, 2013).
There is no consensus in the literature about how to model environmental damage
due to pollution. Some authors consider the damages as income loss (Karp and Tsur,
2011 and Tsur and Withagen, 2012) or social welfare loss (Van der Ploeg and Withagen,
2012 and Prieur et al., 2013). Other authors focus on productive sectors: capital loss
(Horii and Ikefuji, 2010); or destruction capacity (Golosov et al., 2011). The present
paper assumes that the economy experiences a catastrophic event (flooding for instance)
1There are various types of irreversibility. It can be an exhaustion of the natural capacity of regen-
eration (Tsur and Withagen, 2013), an irreversibility in the decision process (Pommeret and Prieur,
2009 and Ayong Le Kama et al., 2011) or a ceiling on the pollution stock (Lafforgue et al., 2008 and
Chakravorty et al., 2012).
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when the level of pollution is above a certain critical threshold. Therefore, the economy
loses part of its productive stock of capital. Moreover, to support the simultaneous use
of both resources, many authors assume a convexity of the production cost of renewable
energy (Chakravorty et al., 1997 and Amigues et al., 2013) or an increasing extraction
cost of fossil fuels (Tsur and Zemel, 2005 and Kollenbach, 2013). For instance, Amigues
et al. (2013) study energy transition in a deterministic framework and consider adjust-
ment costs over production capacity of renewable energy. They identify three energy
regimes in a partial equilibrium setting with an intermediate regime of simultaneous use
of both resources. In addition, several studies assume imperfect or perfect substitution
between inputs. Alternatively, we consider the case of an economy with rigidities such
that oil and RE sources are complementary as in Pelli (2012). Moreover, we also assume
that capital use and energy are complementary, as in Pindyck and Rotemberg (1983),
Boucekkine and Pommeret (2004) or Diaz and Puch (2013).
In a deterministic framework, Boucekkine et al. (2013) provide first order optimality
conditions in an optimal regime switching problem with threshold effects. These optimal-
ity conditions are the continuity of appropriate co-states and states variables, and that of
the Hamiltonian. The present paper is mainly related to the application in Boucekkine
et al. (2013) as it involves both the switching decision to cleaner energy sources and
the pollution threshold effect as the main drivers of energy transition. However, the
contribution of our paper is threefold. First, we use a two-sector approach in which the
economy requires capital to produce energy that can be used as inputs to produce a
final good. We do not allow a natural regeneration capacity, instead we consider the
irreversibility of pollution for a loss of capital. In the same vein, we do not account for
direct pollution damage, but only the loss of productive capital due to the occurrence of
the catastrophe. In contrast to Boucekkine et al. (2013), we allow a simultaneous use
of both resources ("dirty" and "clean" energies). More precisely, we assume that there
is a complementarity between both resource use and capital in the production of final
goods.
Second we numerically show that the optimal energy transition path may correspond
to a corner regime in which the economy starts using both resources, crosses the pol-
lution threshold by losing a part of its capital and never adopts only renewable energy.
This result is in line with the asymptotic energy transition argument that states that the
transition to "clean" energy may happen only in the long run. For policy implications,
economic instruments such as taxes on "dirty" energy and subsidies on "clean" energy
need to be implemented in order to promote the energy transition. But those economic
instruments should be carefully designed in line with the asymptotic energy transition
result. Sensitivity analysis also shows that economy reduces the use of energy resource as
long as the productivity of capital and energy services is high. Therefore, public policies
should promote investments in energy innovation that targets productive sector, home
appliances and buildings and helps to save both money and energy.
Third, we extend our model to the adoption of energy saving technologies. Very few
works deal with the adoption of energy saving technologies (Charlier et al., 2011; De
3
Groot et al., 2001 and Acemoglu et al., 2012). In order to fill this gap in the literature
about the importance of EST in energy transition, we extend our model to allow for
investment decisions in EST. More precisely, the economy may decide to invest in energy
saving appliances or in energy efficient systems to reduce overall energy consumption.
This investment is additional to that made in clean energy to help reach the energy
transition targets. Numerical results mainly show that this additional investment favours
the energy transition in the sense that it increases the time within which the economy
may experience the catastrophe and the welfare of the society. It is then profitable to
design economic instruments that jointly target the promotion of "clean" energy and
incentives for investment in energy saving technologies. This is particularly important
for developing countries that mostly rely on polluting energy resources and are the most
vulnerable to climate change. The remainder of this paper is structured as follows.
The model is presented in Section 2. We analyze the optimal energy transition path in
Section 3. Section 4 extends the model to allow investment in EST. Finally, we conclude
in Section 5.
2 Model
We consider a closed economy that produces energy and final goods in a general equilib-
rium setting. The economy uses a "dirty" source (exhaustible oil reserves) and a "clean"
source (solar panels) to produce energy. Part of the energy is used as energy services by
a representative consumer through a CRRA utility function. The other part is used as
input in a Leontief production function to produce final goods. The use of "dirty" energy
by both final goods sector and households has a negative impact on the environment.
Above a certain pollution threshold, the economy experiences a catastrophic event (fol-
lowing flooding for instance) and loses a part of its stock of capital. In the following
sections, we describe the energy sector, the final good sector, households’ utility and
pollution threats, respectively.
2.1 Energy sector
Energy is an intermediate good that is produced using Es, a non-renewable and "dirty"
source, and Ex, a renewable and "clean" source. A representative consumer uses part
E2 of the energy as energy services, while the other part E1 is used as input to produce
final goods. Let us denote respectively E2s, E2x, E1s and E1x the parts of the NRE
and RE that households use and that the final goods sector uses. We assume that the
production of the NRE is costless. The stock St of the NRE at each time t is generated
by the following dynamics:
dSt = −Estdt (1)
where Est is the rate of extraction of the NRE.
The production of RE requires the use of capital. For instance, to produce solar
(respectively wind) energy, one needs to install some solar panels (respectively wind
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turbines) in order to transform solar (respectively wind) into electricity. Hence we assume
a "ϕ-to-one" transformation of K1, a part φ of capital K as follows:
Ex = ϕK1 = ϕφK (2)
where ϕ is the productivity of capital in the RE sector and is greater than one (ϕ > 1).
In our model, pollution only comes from the use of "dirty" energy. The following
energy market clearing conditions holds.
The NRE that the economy produces is fully used as consumption by households and
as input to produce final goods:
Est = E1st + E2st. (3)
The total production of the RE is split into the final goods sector and the household
energy consumption:
Ext = E1xt + E2xt. (4)
Finally, the total energy that is used in the economy is that from the NRE and the RE:
E1t + E2t = Ext + Est. (5)
2.2 Pollution threat
The use of the NRE either as consumption by household or as inputs to produce final
goods generates GHG emissions. Pollution accumulates in the environment (atmosphere)
according to the following process:

Zt = Est. (6)
We do not account for the natural regeneration capacity of environment as in Van der
Ploeg and Withagen (2012, 2014). This can be seen as the most pessimistic way to deal
with the threat of pollution to justify the necessity of an energy transition. Moreover,
the economy experiences a catastrophic event (flooding for instance). When the level
of pollution Zt is above a certain critical threshold Z, the economy loses a part θ of its
capital stock.
2.3 Final good sector
In order to produce a final good Y, a part E1 = E1st +E1xt of energy and a part 1−φ of
capital (K2) serve as inputs in a Leontief production function. The interpretation runs as
follows. There exist operating costs whose size depends on the energy requirement of the
capital, such that to any capital use there corresponds a given energy requirement. Such
a complementarity is assumed in order to be consistent with several studies arguing that
capital and energy are complements (see for instance Berndt and Wood, 1974; Pindyck
and Rotemberg, 1983; and more recently Diaz and Puch, 2013). The production function
is defined as:
Y = min{α2K2, β2E1t} (7)
5
with K2 = (1− φ)K.
Additionally, we assume that both oil and the renewable resource use are complemen-
tary. Two types of justifications can be provided. First, using an econometric approach,
Pelli (2012) proves that there exists some complementarity between the "dirty" sources
of energy (oil, coal, gases) and the "clean" ones (hydroelectric, biomass-wood and waste,
geothermal, solar/photovoltaic, wind and nuclear). The intuition is that the production
of energy using RE source, for instance through solar panels, requires oil to build the
solar panels. Second, the presence of rigidities in a macroeconomic view may also explain
this complementary between the oil and RE source: it is not easy to substitute between
oil and electricity provided by solar panels. We define E1t as:
E1t = min{1
ξ
E1st, E1xt} (8)
where ξ is the part of the NRE used in the energy mix.
2.4 Households
We consider a representative household using the energy services E2 and that con-
sumes a non-energy good C. The utility U represents the consumer’s preferences that
are expressed by the expected discounted sum of instantaneous CRRA utility flows:
U =
∞ˆ
0
u(Ct, E2t)e
−ρtdt (9)
and
u =
C1−δt
1− δ +
E1−δ2t
1− δ (10)
where ρ is the discount rate and δ is the coefficient of relative risk aversion that is
different from 1.
Both RE and NRE are complementary for the same reasons as in the final goods
sector:
E2t = min{1
ξ
E2st, E2xt} (11)
where ξ is the part of the NRE used in the energy mix.
Households own firms in both the energy and final goods sectors. They consume a
part of the final good production and invest the rest to produce clean energy and final
goods:
Y t = Ct +

K1t +

K2t. (12)
In the following sections, we first analyze the optimal energy transition path. In Section
4, we provide the numerical results. Finally, we extend the model to the adoption of
energy saving technologies in Section 5.
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3 Optimal energy transition path
In this section, we first analyze the general energy transition path that includes the energy
regime switch and the occurrence of a catastrophic event. Three regimes can occur that
correspond to the energy transition path. In the first, energy is produced by both oil
and the renewable resource that are complementary, and the level of pollution is below
the threshold. In the second regime, both energy sources are used again but pollution
is above the threshold. Only renewable resources are used in the third regime. The
second part of this section focuses on corner regimes as specific cases that we compare to
the general energy transition path to isolate the optimal path. We exclude four corner
regimes among a total of height corners regimes because they are unfeasible. The regimes
of T1 = 0 combined with T2 > 0, T2 = 0 or T2=∞ cannot occur because the economy
cannot start above the pollution threshold without consuming the polluting energy. If
the economy starts with a RE, it will never cross the pollution threshold as the RE is
a "clean" energy. Thus, the regime that corresponds to the case T2 = 0 and T1 > 0
is not possible. Finally, we work with the following corner regimes. The economy only
switches on the energy regime (T1=∞), the pollution regime (T2=∞), or the economy
never switches (T1=∞ and T2=∞). The economy can also start with the RE and never
switches on the pollution regime (T1=∞ and T2=0). In the last part of this section, we
numerically solve for the optimal switching time associated with these corner regimes
and the general regime, and provide the corresponding value function.
3.1 General energy transition path
In this section, we analyze the general energy transition path that is described as the
following. The economy starts using both sources of energy (RE and NRE) and therefore
starts polluting. The economy accumulates the pollution up to the threshold Z. Once
the level of pollution exceeds this critical level Z, the economy experiences a catastrophic
event that could be a flooding, for instance. The economy still uses both sources of energy
before completely switching to the sole use of the "clean" energy. We backward solve
for the optimal general path by starting from the third regime (sole use of RE) that
is followed by the second regime and lastly by the first regime. We use the boundary
conditions as in Boucekkine et al. (2013) to find the optimal time at which the economy
will cross the critical pollution threshold and will turn to "clean" energy only. As it is
not possible to get an analytical solution, we solve it numerically.
3.1.1 Third energy regime (RE, Z)
During the third regime, the economy is no longer polluting because it stops using the
"dirty" energy source. The "clean" energy is the only available energy sources in the
economy. Therefore, constraints on pollution accumulation and on NRE accumulation
both become irrelevant. The economy has already crossed the critical pollution thresh-
old and therefore still faces the negative consequences of the catastrophe. In this case,
the social planner maximizes the sum of discounted utility subject to the constraint of
capital accumulation.
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The fact that the capital is split into final goods sector (K2t) and "clean" energy
sector (K1t), together with the "Leontief conditions" in the final goods sector, help in
deducing the following equation of capital accumulation (see the proof in Appendix A):

K = α2(K − 1
ϕ
E1 − 1
ϕ
E2)− C.
The social planner solves the following programme:
V3 = Max
´∞
T2
(C
1−δ
1−δ +
E1−δ2
1−δ )e
−ρ(t−T2)dt
st

K = α2(K − 1ϕE1 − 1ϕE2)− C.
The first order conditions (FOCs) with respect to C, E2 and K respectively give:
C−δ = λ (13)
E−δ2 =
α2
ϕ
λ (14)
and

λ
λ
= ρ− α2. (15)
One can easily identify the consumption versus savings arbitrage condition in equations
(13) and (14). It states that the marginal value of capital has to equal the marginal
utility of consumption on the one hand and the marginal utility of energy services on
the other hand. Moreover, condition (15) implies a constant instantaneous return over
capital.
As energy services E1 and capital K2 are complementary in the final goods sector,
we obtain:
Y = α2(K − 1
ϕ
E1 − 1
ϕ
E2) = β2E1. (16)
Solving the equation of capital accumulation by using equations (13)-(16) and the transver-
sality condition (see the proof in Appendix B), we obtain:
Kt = − Θδ
α2 − ρ− δΛλ
− 1
δ
T2
e(
α2−ρ
δ
)(t−T2),
where the unknown λT2 will be determined in Section 3.1.4 by using boundary conditions.
We can easily deduce the value function V3 during the third regime:
V3 = −
δ[1 + (α2
ϕ
)−
1−δ
δ ]λ
− 1−δ
δ
T2
(1− δ)[α2(1− δ)− ρ] .
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3.1.2 Second energy regime (NRE-RE, Z)
The economy uses both RE and NRE sources in the second energy regime. Despite the
use of the "dirty" energy, the constraint on pollution accumulation is irrelevant because
the economy has already crossed the critical pollution threshold. The economy starts
facing damages from the catastrophe that has occurred. The social planner maximizes
the sum of the discounted post event utilities and the discounted value function of the
third regime subject to constraints on capital accumulation and on NRE accumulation.
By using Y = α2K2 because of "Leontief conditions" andK2 = (1−φ)K, the equation
of capital accumulation becomes:

K = α2(1− φ)K − C.
The complementarity between the NRE and the RE, respectively gives that:
E1t =
1
ξ
E1st = E1xt and E2t = 1ξE2st = E2xt. This implies that E1st = ξE1t, and
E2st = ξE2t. By summing up the two precedent expressions, we get that Est = ξ(E1t +
E2t). The latter expression in (1) gives:

St = −Est = −ξ(E1t + E2t).
The social planner solves the following programme:
V2 = Max
´ T2
T1
(C
1−δ
1−δ +
E1−δ2
1−δ )e
−ρ(t−T1) + V3 ∗ e−ρT2
st


K = α2(1− φ)K − C

S = −ξ(E1 + E2).
The resolution of the equation of capital accumulation using FOCs gives (see proof
in Appendix C):
Kt = −(K2 −KT1) ∗ e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)(t−T1) +K2,
where K2 is unknown and will be determined by using boundary conditions in Section
3.1.4. Finally, by using the fact that the NRE is exhaustible and the fact that we have
crossed the second pollution regime after a period of time T1, we get (see proof in Ap-
pendix D):
λ2.T1 =
1
ξ
[(−S0+Z
ξ
+α2(1−φ)
β2
K2(T2−T1)− α2(1−φ)δβ2(α2(1−φ)−ρ)(K1−K0)e
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
T1∗[eα2(1−φ)−ρδ ∗(T2−T1)−
1]) ρ
δ[e−
ρ
δ
T1−1]
]−δ,
where λ2.T1 , KT1 andK2 are unknown that will be determined by boundary conditions
in Section 3.1.4.
3.1.3 First energy regime (NR, Z)
At the beginning of the programme, the economy starts using both energy sources and
faces a pollution accumulation constraint. A catastrophic event may happen as soon as
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the level of pollution reaches its critical threshold that results in a loss of capital during
the following two regimes. We assume that the NRE is abundant (S0 > Z) so that we do
not need to consider the accumulation of the NRE during the first regime. Therefore, the
economy crosses the pollution threshold before the complete depletion of the NRE. The
social planner maximizes the sum of the discounted pre-event utilities and the discounted
value function of the second regime subject to the constraint on capital accumulation
and on pollution accumulation. As we do not take into account the regeneration capacity
of the environment, the equation of the pollution accumulation can be expressed as the
opposite of that of the NRE:

Z = −

S = ξ(E1 + E2).
The social planner solves:
V1 = Max
´ T1
0
[(C
1−δ
1−δ +
E1−δ2
1−δ )e
−ρt]dt+ V ∗2 e
−ρT1
st


K = α2(1− φ)K − C

Z = ξ(E1 + E2).
The FOCs give (see proof in Appendix E):

K − α2(1− φ)K = −λ−
1
δ
1.0 e
(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)t.
We solve the above equation to get:
Kt = −(K1 −K0)e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)t +K1.
Finally, we use the fact that at the end of the first regime we cross the pollution thresh-
old, and we obtain:
1
ξ
Z = −(−λ2.0ξ)− 1δ ∗ δρ [e−
ρ
δ
T1−1]+α2(1−φ)
β2
K1∗T1− α2(1−φ)δβ2(α2(1−φ)−ρ)(K1−K0)
[
e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)∗T1 − 1
]
.
This implies that:
λ2.0 = −1ξ [(−Zξ +α2(1−φ)β2 K1∗T1−
α2(1−φ)δ
β2(α2(1−φ)−ρ)(K1−K0)[e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)∗T1−1])∗ ρ
δ[e−
ρ
δ
T1−1]
]−δ,
where λ2.0 and K1 are unknown and will be determined in Section 3.1.4 using bound-
ary conditions.
3.1.4 Boundary conditions
Following Boucekkine et al. (2013), we use three types of boundary conditions: (i)
continuity of λ1 ; (ii) continuity of K; and (iii) the equality of the Hamiltonian at the
switching time. The co-state variable λ2 associated with the pollution stock Z is not
continuous at the switching time T1 because Z is fixed to Z. At the switching time
T2, Z can be freely chosen and becomes continuous but it no longer exists during the
third regime because the RE is not polluting. The continuity of λ1 together with that
of K helps to determine K1, K2, KT1 , KT2 , λT2 , λ2.0 and λ2.T1 (Proof available upon
request). We then simultaneously and numerically solve the equality of Hamiltonians at
the switching time T1 and T2 to get T1 and T2. Now, let us look at the corner regimes
before providing the numerical value function.
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3.2 Corner regimes
As we exclude four corner regimes among a total of eight corners regimes because they
are unfeasible, in this section we present only the four relevant ones.
3.2.1 Sole switch to the energy regime (T1=∞)
This case is a corner regime in which the economy never exceeds the critical pollution
threshold and therefore only switches to the sole adoption of clean energy. The econ-
omy starts using both oil and the renewable resource that are complementary, and the
pollution is below its critical level. After some time T , it switches to the sole use of
renewable energy before the level of pollution crosses the pollution threshold. Therefore,
the economy escapes the catastrophe forever. To get the switching time T, it is sufficient
to set T1=∞ and T2 = T .
3.2.2 Sole switch above the pollution threshold level (T2=∞)
This case corresponds to the transition from the first regime to the second regime with-
out the switch to the third regime. Again, the economy starts using both oil and the
renewable source of energy with a level of pollution that is below the threshold level.
Then, the economy switches to the regime in which both energy sources are still used but,
the level of pollution is now above its critical threshold and the economy never adopts
the renewable energy. To get the switching time T and the dynamics of variables, one
needs to set T2=∞ and T1 = T .
3.2.3 No switch (T1=∞ and T2=∞)
On the no switch transition path, the economy always uses both oil and the renewable
source of energy. Moreover, it never solely uses the RE and the level of pollution remains
below its critical threshold forever. This energy transition path corresponds to the first
regime and one does not need to use boundary conditions to get the switching time. It
is sufficient to set T1=∞ and use the transversality conditions that give K1 = 0.
3.2.4 Starting with RE (T1=∞ and T2=0)
On this transition path, the economy never uses the NRE and therefore does not pollute.
The pollution threshold then becomes irrelevant. It corresponds to the third regime
without any pollution threat. In this case, we need to set T1=∞ and T2=0.
4 Numerical results
In this section, we numerically solve for the switching times T1 and T2, and calculate the
value functions of the general energy path and that of each corner regimes. We present
the parameter values that are used to get the numerical results. We also provide the
numerical value functions and the sensitivity analysis.
11
4.1 Parameter values
The parameter values are chosen as follows. As we are concerned about environmental
issues (pollution) that can lead to a catastrophic event, we set the discount rate ρ to
0.05, so that people are more patient and concerned about the consequences of their
behaviour in the future. This value of 0.05 is standard in the economics literature. The
sensitivity analysis will help to show how the pollution could evolve in the case where
people are impatient (high discount factor). We consider an initial stock of the NRE S0
equals to 28000 and the pollution threshold Z = 1000 as a benchmark. In the final goods
sector, we set the parameter α2 that is related to capital to 0.0001 and that of energy β2
to 0.02 in the Leontief function. As we are concened about energy issues, we focus on
energy-intensive final goods. The factor of capital transformation into energy ϕ is set to
1.5. This coefficient is higher than one so that one unit of capital produces more than one
unit of clean energy. We also assume that to get one unit of energy services, the economy
should provide 1.5 units of the NRE such that ξ=1.5. The part of capital that is lost due
to the catastrophe θ is set to 0.05. The value of the degree of relative risk aversion δ and
that of the initial level of capital are set to 2 and 95, respectively. Finally, we take φ=0.1.
We compare the value functions among them and choose the optimal one that gives
the highest value function. We also perform a sensitivity analysis to check for the impact
of each parameter on the switching time.
4.2 Value functions
The numerical results are summarized in the table below.
Energy transition path values functions
General energy transition path –36.7722
T1=∞, -42.4142
T2=∞ -17.6568
T1=∞ and T2=∞ -19.2455
T1=∞ and T2=0 -50.8961
Table 1: Numerical results
The optimal energy transition path is the one that gives the highest value function to
the planner. It corresponds to T2=∞ corner regime. It means that the optimal energy
transition path can be described as follows. The economy starts using both sources of
energy. Then, it crosses the pollution threshold and loses a part of its capital. Finally,
the sole adoption of the renewable energy is optimal only in the long run. One could
observe that the corner regime that corresponds to T1=∞ and T2=∞ case is close to
that of the optimal one. This may be justified by the fact that the economy does not
lose or gain enough by refraining to pollute more in order to never cross the pollution
threshold. One could also remark that the general energy transition path is far from
being the optimal one. Hence, we can conclude that there exist parameters that imply
that it is not optimal to only adopt RE. This surprising result goes in line with the
asymptotic energy transition arguments that state that the complete transition to the
sole use of clean energy may happen only in the long run. It may be a consequence of
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the impossibility of self-reproducing renewable energy. As the economy still needs fossil
fuels to produce clean energy, it is efficient to progressively replace fossil fuels with a
clean source of energy. Then, a quick and full energy transition is not optimal for the
economy, and one should not expect any immediate transition to an economy that only
uses renewable sources of energy.
4.3 Sensitivity analysis
We summarize the sensitivity analysis in the table below.
ρ θ S0 α2 β2 Z
T1 - + small effect + + +
Table 2: Sensitivity analysis
Sensitivity analysis shows that the optimal time to cross the pollution threshold pos-
itively depends on: (i) the corresponding capital loss; (ii) the productivity of capital and
energy services; and (iii) the level of the pollution threshold. Moreover, it negatively
depends on the discount rate.
The more impatient social planner is willing to extract more NRE and will quickly
cross the critical pollution threshold. As the damage from the catastrophic event is high,
people will fear the negative consequences of their "dirty" energy use and will reduce
it. This could help them to stay longer in the first regime before crossing the pollu-
tion threshold. This suggests that the economy that fears the negative consequences of
climate change and the risk of ecological catastrophe is more favorable to the energy
transition. In terms of policy implications, people must be more sensitized about the
potential consequences of their use of fossil fuels.
Likewise, people will reduce their use of energy resource as long as the productivity of
capital and energy services is high. Therefore, public policies should promote investments
in energy innovation that targets productive sector, home appliances and buildings and
helps to save both money and energy. The higher the pollution threshold that could
provoke the catastrophic event, the more people will stay in the pre-event regime. Finally,
the initial stock of the NRE does not matter. The social planner mainly cares about the
management of the initial stock of the NRE so that the switching time T1 is robust with
respect to the initial stock of the NRE.
5 Introducing investment in Energy Saving Technolo-
gies (EST)
Let us recall that E1 and E2 are energy services in the final goods sector and for house-
holds respectively. The final goods sector uses E1s of the NRE and E1x of the RE, while
households use E2s of the NRE and E2x of the RE. At each period of time, in addition to
consumption and investments in energy sector and final goods sector, the economy now
invests a part of the final goods production qt in energy saving technologies. We assume
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that the investment qt serves to reduce by ϑ(q) units the resources that the economy
needs in order to get the same energy services. Implicitly, it means that we do not
account for a scale effect.2 Let us assume that ϑ(q) is an increasing function (ϑ′(q) > 0)
and exhibits decreasing marginal returns ( ϑ′′(q) < 0) in the abatement investment. ϑ(q)
is increasing in the sense that the more the economy invests in EST, the more it reduces
the use of the energy resource to get a given energy service. Moreover, as varθ(q) is
increasing, we assume that ϑ(q) is concave in order to have a maximum for ϑ(q). Also,
we avoid a complete elimination of the use of energy resources so that it will require an
infinite amount of investment to do so ( lim
q→∞
Ei−ϑ(q) = 0 with i ∈ {1, 2} and ϑ(0) = 0 ).
Due to the investment qt in energy saving technologies, the dynamics of capital, of
the NRE and that of pollution are modified, while the utility of the household remains
the same (Proof available upon request). Note that those dynamics do not change in
terms of the extraction of energy resource, but only in terms of the energy services.
The same amount of energy resource provides more energy services when the energy
saving technologies are used. In comparison with the previous model, the social planner
has to consider one additional control variable (investment qt) to solve for the optimal
energy transition. The main changes in the results are the following (Proof available
upon request). The level of capital at each period of time during the three regimes has
an additional negative component. In fact, the economy additionally uses a part of its
income to invest in EST. This part could have been invested in productive sector (final
goods and energy) or consumed by households. As the share of the income that goes to
investment is reduced by investment in energy saving technologies, one should expect a
decrease in capital.
As before, we also discuss corner regimes that we compare to the general energy
transition path to isolate the optimal one. In order to make our numerical results
comparable, we use the same set of parameter values as before. Additionally, we set
the productivities of investment in EST both at the household level and at industry
level σ to 0.2. We numerically solve for the switching times T1 and T2 and calculate the
value functions of the general energy path and that of each corner regimes. We compare
the value functions among them and find out the optimal one that gives the highest
value function. We also perform a sensitivity analysis to check for the impact of each
of the parameters on the switching times. The numerical results are threefold. First,
investments in energy saving technologies do not alter the optimal energy transition
path which remains the asymptotic transition to the sole use of renewable energy. The
second result is that investments in energy saving technologies increase the time at
which the economy may experience the catastrophe and that of the sole adoption of the
renewable energy. In fact, investments in energy saving technologies help to reduce the
consumption of energy for the same quality of energy services and therefore help to reduce
the pollution. Although investment in EST reduces the share of the income that goes to
investment in both the final goods sector and the renewable energy production sector,
2One should also consider that the investment qt induces a scale effect. This makes the present
model very complex and unsolvable because of the interaction that may appear between qt and all the
precedent control variables like the energy services.
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it favours the energy transition. Last but not least, investment in EST increases the
welfare of the society. Then, it is profitable for the economy to combine both adoption
of renewable energy and investments in energy saving technologies.
6 Conclusion
This paper makes three contributions. First, it proposes a general appraisal of optimal
switching problems of energy transition exhibiting: (i) the possibility of a catastrophe
due to pollution accumulation; and (ii) technological regimes with the adoption of re-
newable energy. Second, it numerically shows that the optimal energy transition path
may correspond to a corner regime in which the economy starts using both resources,
crosses the pollution threshold by losing a part of its capital and never adopts a regime
with only renewable energy. This result is in line with the asymptotic energy transition
argument stating that the transition to a clean energy may happen only in the long run.
We also show that economy reduces the use of energy resource as long as the produc-
tivity of capital and energy services is high. Therefore, public policies should promote
investments in energy innovation that targets productive sector, home appliances and
buildings and helps to save both money and energy. The third contribution of this paper
is to extend this model to the adoption of energy saving technologies. We mainly find
that investments in energy saving technologies do not alter the optimal energy transition
path. Moreover, investments in energy saving technologies favour energy transition in
the sense that it increases the time at which the economy may experience the catastrophe
and that of the sole adoption of the renewable energy. Finally, as investment in EST
increases the welfare of the society, it is then profitable to combine both adoption of
renewable energy and investments in energy saving technologies. However, investments
in EST reduce the share of the income that goes to investment in both the final goods
sector and the renewable energy production sector.
In terms of policy implications, we recommend that it is important to adopt some eco-
nomic instruments such as taxes on the "dirty" energy, subsidies on the "clean" energy,
or incentives for energy saving technologies in order to promote the energy transition.
Also, it is profitable to design economic instruments that jointly target the promotion
of "clean" energy and incentives for investments in energy saving technologies. This is
particularly important for developing countries that mostly rely on polluting energy re-
sources and are the most vulnerable to climate change. But those economic instruments
should be designed to meet the requirements of a transition to a sole use of "clean" en-
ergy in the long run. In fact, as a quick and full transition is not optimal for the economy,
we should not expect any immediate transition to an economy that only uses renewable
sources of energy. This paper can be extended to investigate the optimal taxes/subsidies
that may favour the adoption of renewable energy and the investments in energy saving
technologies in line with the asymptotic energy transition result.
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7 Appendix
7.1 Appendix A
Let us recall that the equation of capital accumulation is:

Kt = Y t − Ct. (17)
We also know that: Y = min{α2K2, β2E1t}, where, K = K1 + K2 and Ex = ϕK1.
Ex = ϕK1 implies that K1 = Exϕ . Then,
K2 = K −K1 = K − Ex
ϕ
. (18)
From "Leontief conditions" in final goods sector, we have that:
Y = α2K2 = β2E1t. (19)
During the third regime, only the RE is used so that we have the following equalities:
E1xt = E1t, and E2xt = E2t. By summing up the above two expressions and plugging it
into successively (18), (19) and into (17) gives

Kt = α2Kt − α2E1t+E2tϕ − Ct.
7.2 Appendix B
To determine the expression of capital in the third regime, we need to solve the following
equation of capital accumulation for the capital Kt:

K = ΛK−Θλ−
1
δ
T2
e(
α2−ρ
δ
)(t−T2), where
Λ = α2β2ϕ
α2+β2ϕ
and Θ = α2β2
α2+β2ϕ
(α2
ϕ
)−
1
δ + 1. By making a change of variables as follows
x = Ke−Λ(t−T2) and using the following transversality conditions lim
t→∞
λtKte
−ρ(t−T2) = 0,
we get that Kt = − Θδα2−ρ−δΛλ
− 1
δ
T2
e(
α2−ρ
δ
)(t−T2), for α2(1− δ) < ρ.
7.3 Appendix C
The expression of capital in the second regime is determined from FOCs as follows.
FOCs lead to: λ1 = λ1.T1e(ρ−α2(1−φ))(t−T1), λ2 = λ2.T1eρ(t−T1), Ct = λ
− 1
δ
1.T1
e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)(t−T1)
and E2t = (ξλ2.T1)−
1
δ e−
ρ
δ
(t−T1). By using the above expression of C, the equation of cap-
ital accumulation becomes:

K − α2(1 − φ)K = −λ−
1
δ
1.T1
e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)(t−T1). Using the same
variable change as in Appendix B and taking Kt at t=T1, give:
Kt = −(K2−KT1)∗e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)(t−T1)+K2, whereK2 is unknown and will be determined
by using boundary conditions in Section 3.1.4.
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7.4 Appendix D
We assume that the NRE is exhaustible and that we have crossed the second regime
after a period of time T1. Then, the initial stock of the NRE S0 is equal to the sum of
the part of the NRE that is used during the first regime which corresponds to the total
amount of pollution Z and the part of the NRE that the economy uses during the second
regime. We have that: S0 =
ˆ T1
0
ξ(E1t + E2t)dt︸ ︷︷ ︸
Z
+
´ T2
T1
ξ(E1t +E2t)dt. This implies that:
S0 − Z =
´ T2
T1
ξ(E1t + E2t)dt =
ξα2
β2
´ T2
T1
Ktdt+ ξ
´ T2
T1
E2tdt, with S0 > Z.
The above equation gives:
1
ξ
(S0 − Z) = −(ξλ2.T1)−
1
δ ∗ δ
ρ
[
e−
ρ
δ
(T2−T1) − 1]+ α2(1−φ)
β2
K2 [(T2 − T1)]− δα2β2(α2(1−φ)−ρ) ∗
(K2 −KT1) ∗
[
e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)(T2−T1) − 1
]
.
7.5 Appendix E
The level of capital at each time during the first regime is determined as follows.
FOCs give: λ1 = λ1.0e(ρ−α2(1−φ))t, λ2 = λ2.0eρt, Ct = λ
− 1
δ
1.0 e
(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)t and E2t =
(−λ2.0ξ)− 1δ e− ρδ t. As before, we also replace the expression of C into the equation of
capital accumulation to get:

K − α2(1 − φ)K = −λ−
1
δ
1.0 e
(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)t. Solving the above
equation and taking Kt at t = 0 give Kt = −(K1 −K0)e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)t +K1. Finally, at the
end of the first regime, we cross the pollution threshold so that Z =
´ T1
0
ξ(E1t + E2t)dt.
This equation then implies that:
λ2.0 = −1ξ [(−Zξ +α2(1−φ)β2 K1∗T1−
α2(1−φ)δ
β2(α2(1−φ)−ρ)(K1−K0)[e(
α2(1−φ)−ρ
δ
)∗T1−1])∗ ρ
δ[e−
ρ
δ
T1−1]
]−δ
where λ2.0 and K1 are unknown and will be determined in Section 3.1.4 using bound-
ary conditions.
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